RUNA SANDVIK: Hi, everyone.
I would like to have a show of hands.
How many of you have heard about or used Tor.
(laughter).
How many of you run a relay?
(applause).
So my talk is about the safety of the Tor network.
My name is Runa Sandvik.
We have contractors working full time and on tour on other projects.
We have volunteers all over the world.
We're also hiring, if anyone is looking for a job, come see me after.
The goal of Tor is to express free speech
and privacy online.
We've met with activists, survivors of domestic abuse, so we do a lot
more than just developing this tiny piece of software.
So sort of like the background for my talk, over the past two years I've
had an opportunity to travel a the lot.
I met with activists in Beirut, journalists in Istanbul, students in DC.
A lot of them have questions about Tor and the Tor network.
How safe is the Tor network?
Who are the real operators?
What about malicious relays?
How much network diversity is there?
And what about the CIA, NSA, Prism, and so on.
So I want to just comment on one straight off.
CIA was does not run Tor.
Tor is not a CIA honeypot.
Tor was originally developed by the U.S.
naval research lab.
That was before 2000.
Since 2002 Tor has been completely free and open source and developed
by the Tor Project.
So before we start kind of go deeper into these topics,
I'll kind of start with a quick introduction
into onion routing.
You can run Tor as a relay or run Tor as a client.
When you run as a relay, you set it up on a computer or a raspberry pie
or whatever it is, and you can decide to run it as an exit relay or
a nonexit relay.
So you can decide whether or not you want Tor users
to exit onto the public Internet from your computer.
In the case you're not running an exit, you'll be calling what's called a nonexit.
That nonexit could also be what's called a guard relay, which
is the first server that users connect to.
So running Tor as a client, you download it onto the computer,
open it up, and your Tor client will then, first off, download the list,
the consensus.
Download the list of all the relays in the network.
And out of those roughly 4,000 relays right now, it will pick three guard relays.
For the next two to three months, it will only choose
between those three when it chooses the first hop.
So after choosing that guard relay, it will choose the middle relay and
the exit relay.
After that, Tor will set up a connection
between your computer and the guard relay and negotiate
a short term session key.
It will then connect through the first server
to the second server and negotiate a second short term key and it
will do the same for the exit relay.
When the whole circuit, the connection from you
to the last from you to the destination website is set up,
the data you sent, for example, I want to visit Twitter.com will be wrapped
in three different layers.
You sent the packet from your computer
to the guard relay and the guard relay will peel
off that third outermost layer and say the packet came from you
and going to somebody else in Tor.
So they'll send the data off, send this blob of data
off to the second relay.
Second relay will peel off that second layer, see that
the packet came from somewhere in Tor.
It's going to somewhere in Tor, but that's all it knows.
So we send it off to the third exit relay, the third relay the exit relay, which
will peel off that final layer, see that it will go to Twitter.com.
In this model there is no single hop that
will see what you are doing online.
Now, the challenge here is if someone, the same person, owns
the guard relay and the exit relay, that person can see what you're
doing online.
That person can see that you are using Tor to visit Twitter.com.
Another issue is the exit relay.
The exit relay operator can look at any traffic going from her relay
to the public Internet.
I'll get back to that later on.
So at the moment there's roughly 4,000 relays
in the Tor network pushing around 2,500 megabytes
a second in aggregate.
And you would think that 4,000 relays, we have 600,000 daily users.
You think 4,000 relays is a good number if you look
at this graph, out of 1,000 are exit relays and only 1,000 are guard relays.
So when your Tor client is trying to choose which servers
to send traffic through, it only has 1,000 or less options
for the first hop and the third hop.
I figured a lot of you will probably want to know
about how Prism or other spying programs factor.
And Tor was originally designed to protect government
communications, to hide where you are and who you're
talking to.
So Tor can't hide the fact that you're talking,
how much you're talking or when you're talking.
What Tor can give you location anonymity.
If you're here at DEF CON and you're using Tor
to connect to Twitter.
Twitter will see you're the one logging
on because you have a user name and password,
but they won't know that you're here.
Like I mentioned, if the same person owns
the guard relay and the exit relay, they can see what you are doing online.
And recently it's sort of, you know, after Snowden leaked
all of these documents we learned that there are countries working together
on other spying programs.
So now the issue the concern is not so much who is running
the relays, but who owns the links?
Who controls the AS's?
Who controls the Internet exchange points?
It's not necessarily about the relays.
So this kind of all fits into whether or not we should,
you know, consider different threats, if we should reconsider
the threat model for Tor.
This is a paper that is that it will be published later this year that
a group at the U.S.
Naval research lab worked on.
It's called The Users Get Routed, Traffic Correlation
by Tor Realistic Adversaries.
They took for the way it works right now
and looked at what happens if you're sending your
at that time through relays that it happened
to be controlled by the same entity, by the same AS, or
in similar Internet exchange points or by countries that are now known
to work together on different spying programs.
We are sort of considering how we can
approach this.
We're sort of trying to figure out if changing
the way Tor selects relays is something that we should actually do
or if users are safer now than if we were to choose
a different algorithm.
This one is from Compass.TorProject.org.
It shows your exit relay and your middle relay.
There is a 25% chance your first server will be in the U.S.
There's a 23% chance your middle he server will be in the U.S.
and a 30% chance you will exit in the U.S.
Below that there is a 29% chance you will enter
in Germany, that your middle relay will be in Germany, but only
a 6% chance you will exit in Germany.
On the top of the list is U.S., Germany, Netherlands, France, Sweden.
So we have 4,000 relays and 150 different countries.
But Tor will look at the relays that are offering
the most bandwidth when choosing which relays to use for its path.
It doesn't look at the countries.
It looks at the bandwidth.
That means that we may not actually have as much diversity
as we would like to, because all the relays are
in countries like the U.S.
and Germany where bandwidth is free and where hosting providers are
actually happy with us setting up relays.
So I wanted to figure out who the relay operators are.
Has the NSA ever set up.
All the data, all consensus documents that has been
generated since 2007 is all on matrix.TorProject.org.
Who owns the IP addresses for all of these relays?
I did not find any government entities running relays.
That means one, we're not data centers, but also maybe they're not running
relays at all.
We know about all the spying programs.
We know they have access to links to Internet exchange points.
They have connections all over the world.
Why would they need to run relay wouldn't necessarily have
to run relays.
A couple of interesting relays that did pop up was TBRAG.
If you're on our mailing list, you would see this name pop up.
TBRAG was the nickname of a few Tor relays that were running
inside China.
We're running as Tor exit relays in China.
20,000 different IP addresses associated with it.
Now, I don't know who inside China would have access
to be able to set up a Tor exit relay, and two, have 20,000 IP addresses
in a year, my guesses is government, university maybe.
But we don't know.
We never actually caught this relay doing anything malicious.
After a year, it sort of just fell off the grid and we haven't seen
it since.
A couple years later Trotsky popped up.
It was the name of a number of a couple thousand relays
in eastern Europe, all running on sort of dial up or at least offering very, very,
very little bandwidth to Tor.
So there was it wasn't an exit.
There was no contact information given as to who were the real operators.
At that point we decided to take it out of the consensus
because we believed it might be a botnet.
We haven't really been able to figure out whether it was a botnet,
but we only saw Trotsky for two or three weeks and that was it.
When I say take out of the consensus, we have a way, and I'll get back
to that later, to when we see that there are relays
misbehaving, we have a way to mark them
as bad and then take them out of the consensus.
When a client is down the list of the Tor relays,
it does not choose bad exits for its circuit.
So Orbot is the Tor for Android.
So you can run Tor as a client on your tablet and you can browse
through Tor.
You can also run as a relay on your air service.
I saw a number of nicknames with the Orbot nickname popping
up in the Middle East.
There were a lot of users with normal phones, smart phones.
Apparently a lot of them set up relays a couple years ago as well.
So there are a lot of different groups sort
of running relays there are those who run relays on a raspberry pie there are
those that try and run bigger groups in the case of Orbot or Trotsky that may
or may not be malicious.
Then there is the groups that are sort of supporting the Tor network
in a completely different way and in a very, very good way.
Torservers.net is a German nonprofit whose only goal
is to increase network diversities.
They will take donations and spend that money on relays for the Tor network,
primarily Tor exit relays, which is when you saw the list of, you know,
there's a 23% chance that you'll exit in the U.S.
or in the Netherlands, most of those relays actually belong
to Torservers.net.
So when you're use it go Tor, you are more likely to end
up using a relay owned by Torservers.net or one
of the other groups that I'll show, because they're running so many relays
and because they're offering so much bandwidth.
You're more likely to use relays that are run
by people that we trust rather than some random guy in, I don't know,
the UK, for example.
They also run relays offering a lot of bandwidth, if you create
a list looking at which relays offer the most bandwidth,
the Computer Club would come up as Number 2.
(applause).
Another group is BFRI in Sweden.
I don't think they have nonprofit yet, but they managed
to get everything together and they're able
to accept donations and put the money towards actually running
high bandwidth relays.
Noistour out of San Francisco.
They will also take donations.
They will also take donations in Bitpoint.
If you can't run a relay, maybe you can donate
to someone who can actually set it up for you.
So malicious relays: There are, I guess, three groups of malicious relays.
The first one is malicious, but not intentional,
meaning that someone set up an exit relay and they have,
you know, open DNS or they have an antivirus that
is blocking certain sites.
While they may feel safe using that, having gone
on a Tor exit relay means that users Tor users will also sort of end
up with the same filter.
So if they can't visit Google.com, then any Tor user will be unable
to visit Google.com.
In those cases we try to contact the relay operators.
And when you are setting up a Tor relay you can sort of put
in your contact information if you want, and if something is wrong,
we know how to contact you.
So we contact these relay operators and ask what's going on and see
if maybe they can just reconfigure their computer to not sensor users.
The second category is straight-up malicious,
those that try and strip off SSL or do some other sort of man
in the middling.
We try to contact when there is contact information given,
but if they're found to actually be just malicious and
they don't have contact information, we'll just take them out of the list.
The third category is passive, sort of more malicious,
but not necessarily detectable.
They may be logging.
I mention when you are using Tor, traffic from you to the exit relay
is visible to the exit relay operator.
It means that the exit relay operator can see what
people are doing online.
They won't know necessarily who is doing what,
but they'll see what people are doing, what websites people are visiting.
In some cases people set up exit relays just to log
all of this information.
That is not something that we can actually at the text.
That is a risk.
Just a risk to be aware of, but I would say that it's probably safer
to use Tor than not these days.
So a question I often get is how bad can it get?
You know, you're using Tor, you have to head
up on a malicious exit relay, how bad can it get?
My answer is that it depends.
I know that's usually an answer that you would hear
from a lawyer, but it really does agenda
on what you're doing and for how long you're to go it and
whether or not you're actually logging on.
Say you're using Tor to access Twitter.
You go to Twitter.com and your browser gives you
a warning about a fake certificate.
Now, if you choose to accept that certificate and log on,
you're giving your adversary, your attacker, your user name
and your password and you have lost.
That is true whether you're using Tor or not.
In the other case, if the person is just logging traffic and you're not
logging in anywhere, and you're not communicating any
sensitive information, that person will just get lots of random data, lots
of websites like you're visiting, but not necessarily a way
to tie that back to you.
Another thing to note is Tor, when creating those circuits,
when choosing those three relays and using them to visit
all the websites that you're visiting, Tor will choose a new path
for your traffic every ten minutes.
So if you're visiting Twitter and you spend, I don't know,
20 minutes on Twitter and you open a new tab
in your browser, Tor will create a new circuit for you.
Whenever Twitter has to open a new TCP connection to pull
in new content, Tor will open a new connection for you.
I don't know how to best answer this question how bad
can it get, because it really does depend
on what you're doing.
I think in a lot of cases it's probably better
to use Tor than to not to use Tor.
And the threats to Tor are pretty similar to using
the open wireless network at Starbucks or elsewhere.
So we have a couple of different tools for sort
of finding these malicious relays.
The first one is called the consensus tracker,
which we created somewhere between the time we saw TPRAG crop
up and Trotzky.
It is a script that every hour it will look at the list of relays are new,
which relays just joined the network.
Send us an e mail.
Anyone can look at the list of new relays joining the network.
So the information we get is sort of the IP address, the port, which ports,
if it allows exit to, content information if that has been set.
Just sort of basic info.
It doesn't really check for maliciousness,
but if we suddenly have, like, 1,000 relays pop up in Syria; it's
at least something we can monitor and keep an eye on.
We created Snakes on a Tour, TOAT.
It will allow you to check for SSL certificates or any sort
of tampering with DNS, any other types of sensor ship
and it was written in python, so it is no longer maintained.
We have been working on the open observatory
for network nervous.
It will check for censorship essentially.
Hopefully, in six months or so, you know I probe will able
to do what SOAT once good so we can actively check for malicious relays
or misbehaving relays.
The Tor we have is SSL checker.
It will take the list of exit relays and a list of URL's that you have given
it, say Twitter and Gmail.com, and it will connect to the exit relays
and download the SSL certificate and then it will do the same
over non Tor and compare the two.
If there is a difference, it will give you a warning.
To be able to check for other malicious behavior
in the future, we hope, so there's, like, three I guess three topics that I sort
of wanted to touch on that I hope that you
will leave this talk with.
One: I want you to use Tor.
It seemed like a lot of people were already using Tor.
In the case that you're not, please to.
We already see that anonymity loves company.
The more people that use Tor, the better off you are.
If you're the only person at DEF CON using Tor, you sort
of stand out.
If you're one out of 12,000 people using Tor,
the better off.
Not a lot of people run relays.
I'm not sure why, if it's lack of bandwidth,
if you just don't know how, if you're worried you'll be an exit relay.
But no matter what the reason is, you can always fund a fast relay.
Funding Tor servers.net We're back.
I think you know the routine.
What are we gonna do now?
(applause).
That mic is dead.
RUNA SANDVIK: I have the mic.
Can I just get really close, then?
RUNA SANDVIK: No.
Just talk really loud.
(laughter).
What are we gonna do?
You all know the routine.
Do we have any first time attendees?
Here.
You, sir, come up.
Your fiancÃ© is here?
Did you want him to come up?
RUNA SANDVIK: No.
SSL certificate.
(laughter).
All right.
To our first time speaker and our first time attendee.
(applause).
RUNA SANDVIK: I have a lot of time for questions.
I sort of wish I had started with that.
(laughter).
You can run a fast relay and help increase network diversity
or you can run an exit scanner or help us improve
the ones that we already have.
And help us find misbehaving relays.
So at this point, being the first time speaker at DEF CON
and talking a lot faster than I usually do, I have a lot of time for questions.
So if you have questions, you can line
up with the microphone up front.
(Off microphone) The people on the network are doing illegal things.
(applause) RUNA SANDVIK: I got half of that.
Do you want to repeat it.
Is it legal to run an exit (inaudible) if the people exiting
the network are doing illegal things?
RUNA SANDVIK: Okay.
Is it safe legally to run an exit relay if the people using your exit relay are
doing illegal things?
Running an exit relay is in some cases check be a bit risky.
So it means that any Tor user, 600,000 users, a lot of them
will be using your server to access the public Internet.
It means anything they do online will be seen as coming
from your computer, from your IP address.
Over the past year there has been stories about people
in Germany having their doors knocked down and their computers taken
or a series of DNC take down notices and similar.
We have spent a lot of time trying to educate law enforcement,
teach them what Tor is, how it works, when or how
they would encounter Tor when investigating people.
That's worked out pretty well.
We have sort of helped them understand that when
they do hit an exit relay, it is Tor.
It doesn't actually log any information.
There is no information to be found there about the Tor users.
But at the same time, if you feel that that is a risk,
then running a nonexit is probably the safer option.
So we have a blog post called tips for running an exit relay
with minimum amount of harassment, which sort of lines out a series
of steps and things to consider if you want to set up an exit relay.
Sort of running on a dedicated server, don't have your personal photos
and GPG and whatever else, chat logs
on the same server that you're running a Tor exit relay.
Do not encrypt that drive in the server that is running
the Tor exit relay felt.
If you have a server with a nonencrypted disk and Tor
is not logging anything, there will be no information on that server
for law enforcement to dig through.
So I would say if you're considering setting
up an exit relay; that would probably be
the first page I would send you to read up on.
Whether or not it's safe legally, I'm not a lawyer,
so I can't really answer that question.
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: Sorry?
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: It's a service that allows you to enter
an IP address and see if server X was running
as a Tor exit relay at time Y.
So in the case that you to run into issues with law enforcement,
you can use that service to sort of point them to our page and sort
of explain to them that you were actually running
an exit relay.
If you do run an exit relay and you run into problems,
you can also e mail us and we will send
a signed letter confirming that, yes, you were running an exit relay
at that point in time.
So there's hidden entrance nodes via bridges.
Are there any to look into having exit nodes in a similar way?
RUNA SANDVIK: Having hidden exit nodes?
Yes.
RUNA SANDVIK: So the question is about bridges.
The image that I showed of how Tor works, mentioned
the guard relay, we also have something called bridges,
which is similar to the guards, just that they're not listed
on the Internet.
You can't find a list of every single Bridge,
which means that if you're in China and you need to connect
to Tor and Tor is being blocked, you can use a Bridge instead.
I don't think I'm not sure if we have even considered hiding
the exit nodes.
I'm not sure if that would actually be
a good defense.
It sort of seems to me like it would be just a bit
of an arms race.
We would hide them someone would find them,
and it would continue from there.
What about running relays in the Cloud and like, for instance,
if there are just a whole bunch of Cloud based
like Amazon AWS based relays, what does that do
with your network diversity?
RUNA SANDVIK: Okay.
Relays so with Amazon specifically, you are allowed had to run a Bridge.
Running a relay is also allowed as terms of service, but you
will be paying too much money for bandwidth.
So you just don't want to do that.
An exit relay is not allowed in the terms of service.
If someone wanted to set up thousands of relays to join
the network, I'm not sure it would help
the diversity too much.
Tor will only pick fast relays to use for its circuits.
So if you have, like, a thousand sort of slow relays joining the network,
then we would have a thousand slow users on the network.
My question is pretty specific
regarding are you aware of whether or not Google fibers' terms
of service restricts you from running an exit relay or not?
RUNA SANDVIK: I don't know.
If anyone from Google is here that can answer that question,
then we would like to know.
No servers on Google fiber.
RUNA SANDVIK: No servers at all?
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: If anyone from Google is here,
then I'd like to talk to you.
(laughter).
No computers on Google fiber.
(laughter).
(applause).
RUNA SANDVIK: Any questions at this point?
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: I didn't hear
the full (Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: If there are more malicious
relays than non?
More malicious users.
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: Okay.
If there are more bad users than good users?
Okay.
We don't know.
So you go to our website and you download Tor, and
the only thing that pops up in our Apache log
is that someone visited Tor.
We don't log your IP address.
We know people are downloading Tor, but that is it.
We have no information.
We don't know what you're using Tor for.
Back in the day someone did a study to see
at least which protocols were used.
It was mostly web traffic.
But apart from that, we have no we have no way
of telling what people are doing over Tor.
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: We were accidently banned
by Facebook, yes.
The issue that was a month ago.
Okay.
So it does happen.
So someone used Tor to sort of try and scrape content
from publicly available content from Facebook and Facebook sort
of accidently blocked a ton of Tor exit relays.
So it does happen.
But we have no way of telling how often it happens
or how many users are actually misbehaving that way.
Can you speak to hidden services.
RUNA SANDVIK: What about hidden services?
Could you briefly detail what they are?
RUNA SANDVIK: Tor Hidden Services, dubbed by the media
as Darth Web, is a way of hosting content anonymously
over Tor.
So it means that you can set up a website and it will have a URL
of 16 characters and dot onion at the end.
It will only be accessible on Tor and no one
will know you are hosting the sites and no one will know who is visiting
the sites because everything is over Tor.
The content cannot be censored.
We cannot find out who is running Tor Hidden Services.
So it's sort of anonymous hosting in a way.
Recently there was a paper published pointing
out a number of issues with Tor Hidden Services.
We wrote a very long blog post explaining
all the things we would like to see improved
with Tor Hidden Services.
How do you establish trust in the consensus?
RUNA SANDVIK: When you set up the question was how do you
establish trust for the consensus?
How do you make sure that the list clients download is a safe list?
When you set up a relay, your relay will tell nine directory authorities that
it exists.
These nine directory authorities will then confirm that your relay has
the IP address that you've said that it has, the nickname matches, if it's
an exit it will make sure that you can actually
exit, and then these nine directory authorities will vote on this information,
whether or not that information is correct.
If the majority of them vote that, yeah, it's correct, is valid,
then that relay makes it into the consensus.
Once they have done that for all the relays in the network,
that list is then signed by every single directory authority.
When the client downloads this list, they will check that
the signatures are okay.
I had a follow up question to that.
Who controls the directory authorities
and who controls the onion domain name services
or servers?
RUNA SANDVIK: Okay.
The directory authorities are run by core Tor Project developers
or people that we trust.
So there's a good mix of some of them are in the U.S., some
of them are outside of the U.S.
Some are run by Tor people and some are not.
But you have to be a trusted member of the community to be able to run one.
The second question was about the .onion domains.
No one really controls that.
You generate a domain when you set
up a Tor hidden service.
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: Japan?
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: Is there diversity
in the directory authorities to protect from corridors
from a certain country?
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: If the NSA server and directed
all Tor traffic to the NSA, then we just wouldn't do it.
(applause).
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: Is there any way for an exit relay
to figure out who the Tor user is?
No.
So the only information that the exit relay has
is that people are doing stuff, people are watching, you know,
videos of cats.
(laughter).
The only thing that you can do, if you were to attack Tor users,
would be to make sure that you are that first hop, that you are
the guard relay and that you are the exit relay.
And doing that when targeting a person seems really, really difficult.
I'm sure you have at least the NSA, probably has way better options
to actually target people than to try and spin a thousand Tor relays.
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: So Tor is TCP only right now.
We have a proposal for UDP, but I'm not sure what the status is.
I don't think we've done a lost work on that for a while.
We have done more work on getting Tor to IPv6 to play nice.
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: Hardware?
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: Could you repeat that?
Hardware integration.
RUNA SANDVIK: Hardware integration?
Okay.
Thanks.
So we have a project called the Tor router, which the goal is just
to take a stock router and put Tor on it and make sure that it sets
up a wireless network where everything that you do on that wireless network
is sent through Tor and that it is also running as a Bridge or a relay
or an exit relay, for example.
That project will probably be announced
in about six months.
There are other projects, like the onion pie?
I know freedom box has sort of worked on some stuff.
There's a lot of work being done.
We need more people to sort of help us test those projects,
but we don't have anything right now.
What's your opinion on an exit node filtering traffic?
RUNA SANDVIK: If you're running an exit node to filter traffic,
then don't run an exit node at all.
Like child pornography?
RUNA SANDVIK: Sure, if you want to talk
about child pornography specifically.
Running an exit relay in general means who are you
to decide what people can and cannot watch online?
Right?
It's you okay.
So you obviously, I think we'll agree, child porn is bad.
What if we gave people the ability to actually decide what Tor users can
and cannot visit through their exit nodes.
Watching videos of cats is bad, so suddenly I'm censoring a number
of Tor users who want to look at totally legitimate things.
So we just decided that we shouldn't decide what users can
and cannot watch.
It also means that we cannot be asked or forced by anyone to censor anything.
We don't control the network.
Users do.
(applause).
Anything else?
On the last point, is there a problem right now with deficiency
in the number of exit nodes?
I can run an exit node by filtering certain sites, like illegal.
(Off microphone) do you think it's worth running an exit node?
Are you guys desperate for exit nodes?
RUNA SANDVIK: We are desperate for exit nodes.
But we would prefer exit nodes that are not touching user traffic regardless
of what it is.
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: There are absolutely no logs.
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: Nine.
The question was if we have any logs at all.
And the answer is no, we don't have anything.
When you visit our website, you download Tor,
we write just zeroes in the log or we write all zeroes
if you're visiting the HDTP.
We don't know you start up Tor and the only there's sort
of two entities that will know you're using Tor.
Your ISP and the guard relay.
They will know you're using Tor.
They won't know what you're using Tor for.
And the exit relay, one will know someone is using Tor
to do something, but they won't know who.
There are no logs.
Nothing to be subpoenaed.
We cannot be given any magical letters to force us to do anything.
We don't have any info about our users.
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: That's a good point.
The ISP, yeah, the ISP, whoever the backbone provider is, that's
a good question.
The question is if they actually look at that traffic.
Is that like a common thing for ISP's or service providers on a top level?
Does the backbone provider log incoming
connections to websites that are hosted by people?
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: If we want if we're going
to put together a list of Tor projects, is that the question?
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: Tor apps?
So we have a list on our website talking
about products and services that we had.
If you're not in that list, then it is not a project that is maintained
or developed by the Tor Project.
Have you ever seen exit nodes attacking to browsers?
RUNA SANDVIK: No.
I have not seen any Tor exit nodes attacking browsers.
So for users running, like, the door browser bundle,
what safeguards are in place to prevent the exit relay
from serving up, like, a malicious Twitter.com
and sending some sort of malicious program back
to their computer to kind of make a connection
on the open Web?
RUNA SANDVIK: So if there are any restrictions
on Like what kind of protections are there?
RUNA SANDVIK: The Tor blocks a lot of things like Flash and Java
and some JavaScript and things like that.
But like I said, if an exit relay is able to inject a very specific type
of exploit into the users traffic, then there are no, like,
if you can do that without getting a user to open an attachment,
then yeah.
(Off microphone) RUNA SANDVIK: Okay.
So he's waving at me saying we're out of time.
We could meet in the chillout room and kind of continue there.
Thanks.