

FORENSIC FAILS

SHIFT + DELETE WON'T HELP YOU HERE

ERIC ROBI + MICHAEL PERKLIN

DEFCON 21

AUGUST 4, 2013

ABOUT THIS GUY

ERIC ROBI


Founder of Elluma Discovery - 11 years

Forensic Examiner

Thousands of exams

Expert Witness

Likes Cats



ABOUT THIS OTHER GUY



MICHAEL PERKLIN



Senior Investigator / Forensic Examiner



Security Professional




Thousands of exams



Likes to break things



... A Lot



AGENDA

7 Stories full of FAIL

Learn something about Forensic Techniques


Fails brought to you by both **THE SUSPECT** and **THE EXAMINER**

*Names have been changed to protect the idiots on both sides

*Many of the case facts have been changed too.

I don't know why. We don't need to. It just seemed like a nice thing to do.

This presentation required the creation of **Teh Fail Matrix**



User Retard Level

10

Punishment Level

5

\$ Distress Caused

5

Bonus Points

15

Fail Matrix

Personal Fial

Lost the case

35

\$\$\$\$

GF left him



FAIL #1 - The "Wasn't Me" Defense




Employee Bob worked in sales at Acme



He resigned his position and left to work for a competitor



Allegation was made that he took Acme's company list with him



FAIL #1 - The "Wasnt Me" Defense

Bob said "I've got nothing to hide". "Come at me bros!".

We began imaging the drive and started planning the examination



Look for deleted files in unallocated space

Look for 'recent files' used by common programs (Word, Excel)

Look for USB device insertion

Finally the drive finished imaging...

DEFCON EXCLUSIVE... New finding!



FAIL #1 - The "Wasnt Me" Defense



Bob had used a data destruction program to overwrite every byte of unallocated space on his drive



He used a pattern that was not likely to appear through normal use of a Windows operating system



The existence of this pattern **MIGHT** suggest **POSSIBLE** willful destruction of evidence



...maybe



What have we learned...

#1



Data destruction software can almost **ALWAYS** be detected



Even if you don't use a repeating pattern, it's still detectable



We may not know what you destroyed



But we definitely know you destroyed **SOMETHING**



Also, mean phrases make people dislike you.



User Retard Level

12

Punishment Level

12

\$ Distress Caused

3

Bonus Points

0

Fail Matrix

Lost the case

27

Under \$100K



FAIL #2 - The Nickelback Guy



Standard case: Allegation of stolen confidential documents




Suspect John left NOCFED industries after 3 years to work for a competitor



John worked on confidential projects



NOCFED was worried John took data to competitor



FAIL #2 - The Nickelback Guy



Opened HDD to begin analysis



Lots of MP3s identified




Found the confidential documents (as expected)



Almost immediately, something jumped out at me as an
examiner

(We'll get into why in a bit...)



FAIL #2 - The Nickelback Guy




It seems that John assumed that nobody would play his Nickelback MP3s!! (a sound assumption)



They are all .avi files with a renamed filename. Clever, kinda



What was he hiding???



FAIL #2 - The Nickelback Guy



PREGGER PORN!!!!



It seemed John did more at work than just work on his confidential project!!



What have we learned...

#2



Examiners see files in a long list; not a folder/tree structure



A "File Signature Analysis" is run that analyzes every file on the HDD





It compares the contents of files with the extensions of the filenames



Any file with a discrepancy is identified for closer analysis



John's attempt at hiding something put it at the top of the list for analysis



User Retard Level

12

Punishment Level

13

\$ Distress Caused

0

Bonus Points

5

Fail Matrix

Lost his job

30

For owning Nickelback



FAIL #3 - JUST BILL ME LATER



ABC Firm outsourced key part of their business for many years





Received bills on an hourly basis. Amounted to several million \$ per year on average.



Client started bill review project. Suspected some tasks were taking a weeeeeee bit too long.



Asked us to help



FAIL #3 - JUST BILL ME LATER



Thousands PDF format invoices not much help.



Where to start? Not a lot of clues ..





Ah ha! Located billing database on vendor's network



Forensic copy of database, migrated DB to MSSQL



No easy way to compare DB to PDFs.



FAIL #3 - JUST BILL ME LATER



Reverse engineered tables in DB



Noticed audit logs were turned on!




Ran many queries of time billed vs. audit logs




Noticed that audit logs showed changes to DB



Time inflation! Rate inflation!





What have we learned #3





Audit logs off by default. Turned ON by IT peeps!



Audit logs are the BEST evidence of theft in a DB case.



LESSON: Don't turn on audit logs if you plan to cheat your client!



User Retard Level

8

Punishment Level

18

\$ Distress Caused

15

Bonus Points

4

Systematic culture of overbilling

Fail Matrix

Had to refund the \$

45

\$12M + refunded



FAIL #4 - Smoking Gun.txt



Smoking Gun.txt is the gag name of "the file that proves the case"






Comes from cheesy western movies where the murderer's gun is still smoking, proving he fired the shot



This case is another intellectual property case



Again, an employee left his company to go work for a competitor



FAIL #4 - Smoking Gum.txt



Imaged the drive



Kicked-off standard analysis scripts





Opened up his Desktop folder



You can tell a lot about a person by the way they
organize their Desktop!



Immediately solved the case



FAIL #4 - Smoking Gun.txt





FAIL #4 - Smoking Gun.txt



The guy had created a folder filled with data from his previous employer



Bonus PowerPoint presentation to bring his new colleagues up-to-speed




What have we learned...

#4



**Sometimes people
don't even try.**



User Retard Level

18

Punishment Level

10

\$ Distress Caused

6

Bonus Points

12


Fail Matrix

Had to settle for \$

46

\$1.5M in damages

Zero effort!



FAIL #5 - HIDING IN THE CLOUD





Top sales guy leaves company. Sales plummet.



They suspect he took customer list, but can't prove it.



We image his computer and start looking for the usual clues:



FAIL #5 - HIDING IN THE CLOUD



Link files: Shows opened files



BagMRU - Registry key shows user folder activity




Jump lists - Shows opened files (Win 7+)



IE history - Shows accessed files



NO LOVE. SHOW ME THE LOVE.



FAIL #5 - HIDING IN THE CLOUD



Searched IE history



Found a .htm file containing some javascript pointing to "filesanywhere.com"





BINGO!



Showed acct ID, upload times, file names



FOUND SOME SWEET LOVIN'! (stolen files)





FAIL #5 - HIDING IN THE CLOUD



//Fill nodes data

```
oNodes[0] = new node("Stolen_File.txt", 'file', 'USER\\Eric\\  
\\Test\\', 'F', "", 'false', '74', '10/19/2011 3:15:05 PM');
```

```
oNodes[1] = new node("Recipe_for_Coke.txt", 'file', USER\\  
\\Eric\\Test\\', 'F', "", 'false', '23', '10/19/2011 3:15:05 PM');
```



- Recovered FilesAnywhere Information


Timestamp (EDT)	Filename	Type	Destination Folder	Size
6/17/10 12:39:26 PM	Agents.xls	file	\\	2,691,584
6/17/10 12:41:30 PM	0 - Generic flyer.doc	file	\\New Reps\\	1,503,744
6/17/10 12:41:30 PM	ACCESSORIAL CHARGE CHANGES.doc	file	\\New Reps\\	58,880
6/17/10 12:41:30 PM	account review worksheet.xls	file	\\New Reps\\	19,968
6/17/10 12:41:30 PM	ACI Codes Guide Training.doc	file	\\New Reps\\	19,968
6/17/10 12:41:30 PM	ACI Codes.xls	file	\\New Reps\\	15,872
6/17/10 12:41:30 PM	Adding venues.doc	file	\\New Reps\\	78,848
6/17/10 12:41:30 PM	Adding venues.pdf	file	\\New Reps\\	30,741
6/17/10 12:41:31 PM	Apples to apples.doc	file	\\New Reps\\	25,600
6/17/10 12:41:36 PM	Carpet brochure.doc	file	\\New Reps\\	2,338,816
6/17/10 12:41:36 PM	Carpet brochure.pdf	file	\\New Reps\\	215,976
6/17/10 12:41:43 PM	Cases and Crates.doc	file	\\New Reps\\	3,163,136
6/17/10 12:41:43 PM	Cases and Crates.pdf	file	\\New Reps\\	241,206
6/17/10 12:41:44 PM	CC REQUEST FORM FORM 2010.doc	file	\\New Reps\\	353,280
6/17/10 12:41:45 PM	CC REQUEST FORM FORM REVISED.doc	file	\\New Reps\\	353,792
6/17/10 12:41:46 PM	Charges & Specials.doc	file	\\New Reps\\	66,048
6/17/10 12:41:46 PM	Cold Call Tracker.pdf	file	\\New Reps\\	5,219
6/17/10 12:41:46 PM	Cold Call Tracker.xls	file	\\New Reps\\	15,872
6/17/10 12:41:46 PM	Cold calling inquisition.doc	file	\\New Reps\\	25,600
6/17/10 12:41:46 PM	Cold calling tree.doc	file	\\New Reps\\	32,768
6/17/10 12:41:46 PM	Cold calling tree.pdf	file	\\New Reps\\	8,689
6/17/10 12:41:47 PM	Combo.doc	file	\\New Reps\\	244,224
6/17/10 12:41:47 PM	Combo.pdf	file	\\New Reps\\	49,134
6/17/10 12:41:47 PM	Conditions of Contract - rev 09-2007.pdf	file	\\New Reps\\	25,611
6/17/10 12:41:47 PM	Conditions of Contract - rev 09-2007.pdf	file	\\	25,611
6/17/10 12:41:47 PM	Conditions of Contract (rev 09-2007).doc	file	\\	33,280
6/17/10 12:41:47 PM	Conditions of Contract (rev 09-2007).doc	file	\\New Reps\\	33,280
6/17/10 12:41:47 PM	Convention Centers.xls	file	\\	30,720
6/17/10 12:41:47 PM	Convention Centers.xls	file	\\New Reps\\	30,720
6/17/10 12:41:48 PM	Credit Card Authorization, 03-29-10.doc	file	\\	428,032
6/17/10 12:41:48 PM	Credit Card Authorization, 03-29-10.doc	file	\\New Reps\\	428,032
6/17/10 12:41:48 PM	Customer service questionnaire.doc	file	\\	29,184
6/17/10 12:41:48 PM	Customer service questionnaire.doc	file	\\New Reps\\	29,184
6/17/10 12:41:54 PM	Display Pages Catalog.pdf	file	\\	2,934,406
6/17/10 12:41:54 PM	Display Pages Catalog.pdf	file	E\\New Reps\\	2,934,406
6/17/10 12:41:55 PM	Domestic Carriers rebuttals.xls	file	\\	31,744
6/17/10 12:41:55 PM	Domestic Carriers rebuttals.xls	file	\\New Reps\\	31,744
6/17/10 12:41:55 PM	Domestic Carriers.xls	file	\\	54,272
6/17/10 12:41:55 PM	Domestic Carriers.xls	file	\\New Reps\\	54,272
6/17/10 12:41:55 PM	Fax cover sheet.doc	file	\\	165,888
6/17/10 12:41:55 PM	Fax cover sheet.doc	file	\\New Reps\\	165,888
6/17/10 12:41:56 PM	Flyer template in header.doc	file	\\	417,280



FAIL #5 - HIDING IN THE CLOUD



Opposing attorney handed us CD with an Outlook.PST



Drafts - Microsoft Outlook



File Edit View Go Tools Actions Help Adobe PDF

Type a question for help

New | Reply | Reply to All | Forward | Find | Type a contact to find

Mail

Favorite Folders

- Inbox
- Sent Items

All Mail Folders

- Search Folders
- Personal Folders
 - Deleted Items
 - Drafts**
 - Inbox
 - Junk E-mail
 - Outbox
 - Sent Items
- Search Folders

Mail

Calendar

Contacts

Tasks

Drafts

To	Subject	Sent	Size
There are no items to show in this view.			



0 Items

FAIL #5 - HIDING IN THE CLOUD



First thing we do is search for deleted emails



Mail

Favorite Folders

- Inbox
- Sent Items

All Mail Folders

- Deleted Items
- CSUF
- CSUF1 (46)**
- Drafts
- Inbox (102)**
- Junk E-mail
- Outbox
- Sent Items
- Search Folders

Mail

Calendar

Contacts

Tasks

Inbox

	From	Subject	Received	Size	
Date: Last Week					
	Microsof...	Welcome to Outlook Express 6	Sat 5/24/2...	16 KB	
	n3td3v	Re: [Full-disclosure] Media blackout on Cisco IOS roo...	Sat 5/24/2...	12 KB	
	n3td3v	[Full-disclosure] Media blackout on Cisco IOS rootkit ...	Sat 5/24/2...	10 KB	
	Eric R	One more	Sat 5/24...	5 KB	
	Eric Robi	Pen testing	Sat 5/24/2...	2 KB	
	Eric R	FW: We have the most detailed Copies	Sat 5/24...	6 KB	
	Eric R	RE: Check this out	Sat 5/24/2...	6 KB	
	Eric Robi	Check this out	Sat 5/24...	26 ...	
	Brett M...	RE: IIS 6 shell	Sat 5/24...	20 ...	
	Adriel ...	Re: DSS (Passing an audit is NOT compliance!)	Sat 5/24...	51 ...	
	Yuli Str...	Re: AppScan and IDS evasion	Sat 5/24...	23 ...	
	korozi...	Re: all-in-one vs one-on-each (feat. Comercia...	Sat 5/24...	13 ...	
	Erin Car...	RE: AppScan and IDS evasion	Sat 5/24...	18 ...	
	Pen Te...	AppScan and IDS evasion	Sat 5/24...	13 ...	
	M.B.Jr.	Kaseya	Sat 5/24/2...	12 KB	
	Ricardo...	IIS 6 shell	Sat 5/24...	16 ...	
	admin...	PCPIN Chat 6: potential XSS vulnerability in U...	Sat 5/24...	7 KB	
	Renato...	[Full-disclosure] Statistics web pages	Sat 5/24...	10 ...	



FAIL #S - HIDING IN THE CLOUD



10s of thousands of deleted emails





Changes the direction of the case 180 degrees



#WINNING



Who deleted the emails...????





What have we Learned #5



IE history is hard to wipe



Found a new artifact (filesanywhere)




.js files are capable of love too!



Uploading files still leaves traces



Attorneys shouldn't mess with evidence! (Especially if they don't understand how PSTs work)



User Retard Level

18

Punishment Level

10

\$ Distress Caused

8

Bonus Points

15

Fail Matrix

Huge lawsuit
51

\$3.5M in fees and damages


Attorney may lose his license



FAIL #6 - The RDP Bounce



Was called in to investigate a network breach



Some symptoms existed that indicated unauthorized access



Large company



Windows environment



Thousands of PCs in multiple sites around the world



FAIL #6 - The RDP Bounce



Analyzed one computer known to have been breached






Logs showed RDP was used to connect in (Local Admin password)



Logs showed RDP was used to connect out



Tip of the iceberg???



FAIL #6 - The RDP Bounce




Analyzed machine that came before



Analyzed machine that came after



Started noticing a pattern...



FAIL #6 - The RDP Bounce



We still wanted to know WHY. What was the target?




Followed the chain forward



Reached a high-profile machine



Target identified. Steal highly-confidential documents



FAIL #6 - The RDP Bounce



Focused analysis on target machine



What did they do?




What did they take?



Within minutes the attacker was identified




How?



Xerox 9700 [1977]



Credit: <http://www.neatorama.com/2009/04/09/massive-old-school-printers/>



FAIL #6 - The RDP Bounce



By default, RDP maps your printer when connecting to a remote machine



This allows you to "print" from their machine to your printer




Attacker forgot to turn this off



What have we learned... #6



Log entries generated from innocuous system events can give insight into user actions



User Retard Level

20

Punishment Level

15

\$ Distress Caused

8

Bonus Points

20

Fail Matrix

Lost job
63

Loss of income, no reference

Do some research!



FAIL #7 - EPIC PORNNO FAIL



Edgar charged with possession of contraband on his computer



Claims innocence (as usual)



Examined the computer and looked at examiner's report and the allegations:



FAIL #7 - EPIC PORNNO




FAIL

Allegations:

#1 Edgar downloaded porn

#2 Edgar's user accounts had passwords

#3 Edgar utilized newsgroups to download porn (for realz???)



FAIL #7 - EPIC PORNO FAIL



Allegation #1



Edgar downloaded illegal porn



Notable thing: Edgar left his house in April 2012



IE History

File **06/29/2012** 11:29:06 Fri SUSPECT file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/SUSPECT/Desktop/DUDE%20profile%20-%20Naughty%20File1.jpg

File **07/25/2012** 16:41:24 Wed SUSPECT file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/SUSPECT/Desktop/DUDE%20profile%20-%20Naughty%20File2.jpg

File **07/25/2012** 16:42:17 Wed SUSPECT file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/SUSPECT/Desktop/DUDE%20profile%20-%20Naughty%20File3.jpg

P2P Software - Download folder



Name: t-287878478-naughty file (sound - english)(2).mpg

Full Path: E:\Users\Joe\AppData\Local\Ares\My Shared Folder\
t-287878478-naughty file (sound - english)(2).mpg

File Created **12/17/12 10:32:56 AM**

Last Accessed **12/17/12 10:32:56 AM**

Last Written **12/17/12 12:57:35 PM**



FAIL #7 - EPIC PORN FAIL



Allegation #2




Edgar used Outlook Express to download porn



FAIL #7 - EPIC PORNNO FAIL



In reality:




Outlook Express set up with account "PornoLuvr"...



AFTER Edgar moved out of his house



Only **headers** downloaded in Outlook Express. No content. No photos! (Just file names).



FAIL #7 - EPIC PORNO FAIL




Allegation #3



Edgar's user account had a password



Inference is that only Edgar had access



LCP - [C:\Program Files (x86)\LCP\pwdB115F.txt]

File View Import Session Help



Dictionary attack Hybrid attack Brute force attack

Dictionary word: 0 / 0 0.0000 % done

User Name	LM Password	NT Password	<8	>14	LM Hash	NT Hash
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Administrator	NO PASSWORD	NO PASSWORD	x		NO PASSWORD	NO PASSWORD
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Guest	NO PASSWORD	NO PASSWORD	x		NO PASSWORD	NO PASSWORD
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Edgar	NO PASSWORD	NO PASSWORD	x		NO PASSWORD	NO PASSWORD

Ready for passwords recovering

3 of 3 passwords were found (100.000%)



FAIL #7 - EPIC PORNNO

FAIL



More facts (undiscovered by examiner)




P2P client used to download porn...



Into a new user account



AFTER Edgar moved out of the house



FAIL #7 - EPIC PORN FAIL



Our report submitted to prosecutor




Government DROPS the charges... YEARS later



and after \$\$\$\$ legal costs



**Super Timeline Analysis - SANS & Rob Lee -THANK
YOU!**



FAIL #7 - EPIC PORNNO

FAIL



Government interviews Edgar's friend





Friend confesses



Friend tried to frame Edgar to get jiggy with Edgar's wife!!



Court clears Edgar's name



What have we learned... #7



Base conclusions upon **ACTUAL EVIDENCE**



Find multiple artifacts backing up allegations



Tie it to a person, not just a machine



FORENSIC FAILS

SHIFT + DELETE WON'T HELP YOU HERE

ERIC ROBI + MICHAEL PERKLIN

DEFCON 21

AUGUST 4, 2013